An Economic and Social Security Council at the United Nations by Frances Stewart and Sam Daws
QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 1
Working Paper Number 68
An Economic and Social Security Council at the United Nations
Frances Stewart and Sam Daws
1
The founders of the UN created no effective institutions for world economic and social
governance, nor for protecting the poor at a world level.  They are needed because: neither
markets nor national governments fully take into account what happens beyond their
borders - for example pollution of the ozone layer, or the effect of interest rate policy in one
country on capital flows elsewhere;  some activities cannot be controlled nationally: for
example international movements of labour and capital, which governments may wish to
regulate or tax; there are worldwide agreements that extreme poverty should be ended, and
yet many governments lack the resources, or power, or will to act.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The founders of the UN created no effective institutions for world economic and social
governance, nor for protecting the poor at a world level.  They are needed because:
?  neither markets nor national governments fully take into account what happens
beyond their borders - for example pollution of the ozone layer, or the effect of
interest rate policy in one country on capital flows elsewhere.
 
?  some activities cannot be controlled nationally: for example international movements
of labour and capital, which governments may wish to regulate or tax.
 
?  there are worldwide agreements that extreme poverty should be ended, and yet





  There has been a huge change in the nature of economic activity over the past few decades.
 Markets have become global in response to technological change and to deregulation:
 
  Trade has grown rapidly but unevenly - with falls in exports concentrated amongst poor
countries; commodity prices, which halved between 1980 and 1998, need to be tackled.
 
  Financial flows have vastly increased, and can create sudden havoc with domestic
economies.  They need regulation.
 
  Transnational corporations (TNCs) dominate trade and technology flows.  They are far
larger than the national economies of many countries, and often inadequately taxed.  They
can only be effectively regulated and taxed at an international level. 
 





  There are evidently a number of important economic, social and environmental issues for
which global action is needed.  Yet despite their large number, the present set of
international institutions do not fulfil the functions needed at a world level.  The most
powerful financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) basically operate on a country-
by-country basis and not globally.  Moreover, the industrialised countries alone determine
the agenda of the IFIs.  The remit of the WTO is confined to conditions of international
trade, implementing rules agreed internationally.  Various organs of the UN, notably the
General Assembly and ECOSOC, have global social and economic functions but, in practice,
do not use them effectively.  This is partly due to their large size, and partly to their ?
democratic? structure, which means that the economically powerful countries can be
overruled by developing countries in these arenas which limits the responsibilities the major
economic powers will agree to give them.
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  We propose an Economic and Social Security Council (ESSC) to cover economic, social
and environmental arenas, with a role similar to that of the Security Council in security
matters.  It would provide a flexible forum where urgent global issues could be considered
at a very high level.
 
  The ESSC would operate by requesting action from existing institutions.  For international
institutions, including the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO and other UN specialised
agencies, the directions of the ESSC would be mandatory.  National governments could not
be compelled to take action, though penalties could be applied if they systematically rejected
requests.  Where existing institutions are inadequate - such as in regulating TNCs, perhaps -
it could set up new ones.
 
  To be effective, membership would have to reflect the realities of power, yet ensure
representation for states at all levels of development.  We propose a body of about 20.  The
ten countries with the greatest economic power would have semi-permanent membership. 
Decision-making would require a two-thirds majority, to ensure the consent of each of the
major groupings of the world.
 
  To be effective, it would also have to be prestigious, attended by Ministers of Finance, with
Prime Ministers or Presidents, if particularly important decisions were to be made.
 
  At a time when international aid flows are falling, poverty rising and environmental problems
increasing, a new impetus is needed behind the implementation of global resolutions on
world poverty and environmental controls.  One of the functions of the ESSC would be to
review progress in these areas, and to take action.  The establishment of an ESSC would be
a signal that the world intends to act as well as talk.
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  I. INTRODUCTION
 
  The main structure of international governance was devised over fifty years ago, with the creation of
the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). There
was a basic flaw in the design.  It failed to include any significant institutions with responsibility for
world economic governance, any responsible for global environmental issues, or any organisations to
protect the poor at a global level.
 
  The omission is even more glaring today.  First, the globalisation of markets in recent decades has
created a new need for global economic policies. Second, increasing global environmental problems
and consciousness of their importance have highlighted the urgent need for action at a world level.
Third, the issue of world poverty and the moral, political and legal basis for action to eradicate it, are
higher on the world agenda then they were in 1945.
 
  Since 1945, institutional progress on these issues has been mixed. On the negative side, the world
institutions created in 1944/5 have not made a major contribution to world economic governance. 
Their role has been less significant than expected and certainly less extensive than was envisaged by
Keynes, one of the chief architects of the post-World War Two institutions. For the most par, ad
hoc solutions were consequently adopted, which are unsatisfactory from many points of view. The
most important global institutional innovation since the 1940s was the establishment of  the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 with responsibility of promoting freer trade.  There has also been
some progress in the development of global institutions in relation to poverty and social needs.
Examples include UNICEF, the UN Children’s Fund; the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP); and the International Development Association (IDA). There have also been steps towards
the international recognition of social and economic human rights. Although poverty eradication has
been accepted as a key objective, the achievements in this area have not been proportionate to the
size of the problem.  Moreover, efforts to protect the environment and promote sustainable
development worldwide have been ad hoc, inadequate, and often unimplemented.
 
  There is an urgent need for a new institutional approach to world economic and social governance.
Despite much talk about the need for such reform at the 50
th Anniversary of the founding of the UN
and Bretton Woods institutions, no major changes were initiated.  The decision-makers of 1944 and
1945 showed unusual imagination and boldness in designing a new international monetary system
and institutional structure that was intended to prevent a recurrence of the economic and social
devastation that followed the First World War. There is an equally pressing need for bold and far-
reaching initiatives today.
 
  It is our view that the creation of an Economic and Social Security Council at the United Nations
would provide a structure to deal with issues of world economic governance and to promote action
on poverty, social needs, sustainable development and environmental governance, in a systematic
and politically realistic way. This paper is intended to explain why such a Council is needed and what
its functions and structure should be.
 
  Section II of this paper considers why neither national governments nor the market can, by
themselves, solve the problems of world economic and social governance. It identifies the economic
and social functions needed in institutions at a global level. Section III reviews the inadequacies of
existing international institutions.  Section IV develops the case for an Economic and Social Security
Council (ESSC) and presents an overview of its potential structure and functions.  Section V
considers functions, composition and procedures in more detail.  The final section draws
conclusions, and compares composition and voting mechanisms of the proposed Council with those
of existing international institutions.
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  II. THE NEED FOR WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE
 
  Global institutions are needed to tackle world economic and social problems including poverty and
international inequality, in situations where neither governments nor markets are likely to do so. The
primary problem with national action is that governments act chiefly in pursuit of their own
objectives, taking little account of the international repercussions of their actions. This may be
rational from the perspective of maximising national welfare in the short-term, but, given the scale of
interactions between countries, each nation can suffer when other nations behave in the same way.
Moreover, high levels of poverty within countries are not only morally unacceptable to the global
community but are increasingly acknowledged as posing a threat to international security.  Global
institutions are essential to ensure that the international implications of national action are taken into
account. National governments and markets need to be influenced to act in a way that will promote
global welfare.
 
  There are three main reasons why such global action may be needed. These parallel the reasons for
government action within a nation. The first is that neither governments nor markets necessarily take
into account the full global consequences of their actions beyond their borders.   The second is that
some activities cannot be controlled domestically.  The third is that there are some objectives which
are agreed at a world level, but which are not effectively implemented either because they are not
shared by particular governments, or because governments cannot meet their commitments due to
limitations in their resources or power.
 
  Collective action because of externalities
 
  In principle, international institutions should provide a basis for the collective action necessary to
promote world welfare, which neither governments acting on their own, nor the market can provide.
This applies in two particular arenas at a world level. The first concerns environmental issues, where
national action has international effects - e.g. damage to the ozone level; excessive carbon dioxide
emissions; sea pollution etc.2  International environmental regulation is essential because in many
such cases, there exist global ‘public goods’ which have to be protected at a world level.  The
second arena concerns national economic activity with world repercussions. Interest rate policy in
one country can affect capital flows elsewhere; budgetary policy can have global consequences;
tariffs affect not only the domestic market but also the markets of others. In the 1930s, the
competitive tariff escalation came to be known as 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policy because of its
international repercussions. 
 
  Phenomena that cannot be nationally controlled
 
  There are some activities that cross borders and are impossible to control without international
cooperation. These include activities which governments dislike and wish to control, such as
international criminal rings; drug production and traffic; some types of arms production and trading.
They also include more desirable activities, such as international movements of labour and capital,
which governments may wish to guide, regulate or tax.
 
  World objectives, especially in relation to economic and social rights 
 
  There is formal agreement, embodied in the International Covenants on Human Rights, as well as a
number of other legally-binding agreements, that people throughout the world are entitled to the
protection of a range of human rights including political liberties and access to social and economic
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goods.
3  There is worldwide acceptance that extreme poverty should be eliminated wherever it
occurs, and that certain human rights abuses, such as have recently occurred in Rwanda, Bosnia or
Kosovo, are not to be tolerated.  National action cannot be relied on to secure these rights and
objectives, either because the governments in question lack the resources or power (financial,
administrative or political) or because they lack the will. International action then becomes
imperative; and international institutions are needed to implement or supervise that action.
 
  Changes in the last half century have increased the need for global action of all three types. There
have been dramatic political and economic changes, increasing the need for collective action at a
world level - hence the imperative of institutional reform. Political realities have altered, rendering
previous decision-making structures inadequate.
 
  The end of colonialism and the growth in the number of nations
 
  An early and radical political change was the dismantling of colonialism and the creation of
independent states.  51 countries constituted the United Nations in 1945.  By 2000, 188 countries
were members.
4  Most of the countries which acquired independence over the intervening years had
very low incomes and were faced with appalling social conditions. With political independence came
the desire to acquire economic independence and to catch up economically and socially with the
industrialised countries.
 
  The end of communism
 
  The second dramatic political change concerns the revolutions of 1989 and the dismantling of the old
Soviet sphere of influence. This, too, has had major implications for the functioning of world
institutions. It has increased the number of countries seeking assistance from international financial
institutions (IFIs) - to aid their transition to a market economy.  Like the ex-colonial countries, these
countries are greatly affected by the IFIs but do not have any power over them.  The change has
meant, in the short term at least, that the UN Security Council has been rejuvenated, released from
the paralysis of the Cold War.  There was an exponential rise in the number of Security Council
resolutions passed annually, from 13 resolutions in 1988 rising to a peak of 93 resolutions in 1992.
5 
The 1990s also saw a widening of the peace and security remit of the Security Council, with Council
debates on matters ranging from humanitarian assistance to the effect of AIDS in Africa.
6
 
  Changing economic power
 
  In 1945 the countries which came to be named the 'Third World' were similar in many respects:
poverty was a dominant characteristic of their economies, they had limited industrial sectors, low
savings and very poor health and education, life expectancy and literacy.  Since then, however,
                                                
       
3 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights both came into force in 1976.  Both ‘civil and political’ and ‘economic, social
and cultural’ rights were originally embodied in the Universal Declaration proclaimed by the General
Assembly in 1948.
 
4 The Security Council recommended on 17
th February 2000 that Tuvalu be admitted to UN
membership.  Upon General Assembly approval it will become the 189
th UN Member. UN Security
Council Record S/PV. 4103.
 
5 See Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws  The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 3
rd Edition.
(Oxford: OUP, 1998), p. 265.
 
6 UN Security Council Debate, ‘Maintaining peace and security: Humanitarian aspects of issues
before the Security Council’, 9
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developments have diverged markedly.  Some countries have grown at a spectacular pace – notably
those in east Asia (the recent financial crisis in that region notwithstanding). Others jogged along
slowly for some time, but recently have accelerated impressively, including countries in south east
Asia and China. Others did fairly well until the 1980s and then collapsed under the weight of
deteriorating commodity prices (as in much of Africa) and the debt crisis (Latin America). Among
the industrialised countries, too, performance differed. In Europe there was rapid recovery from the
devastation of war, followed by sustained growth, and increasing economic power as a result of the
formation of the European Community.  Japan achieved very high growth rates for three decades
after 1950, but subsequently stagnated.  US economic growth was sustained over the period (with
fluctuations), accelerating in the most recent decade.
 
  The net effect of economic developments since 1945 has been a massive change in the world
distribution of output.  US and European dominance has been greatly reduced as the economic status
of Japan, and latterly developing countries, has increased, though the US remains the most important
economic power. These changes in political status and economic development since 1945 have not
been properly reflected in the structure of decision-making in world institutions. 'Democratic'
institutions such as the General Assembly  have expanded their membership and voting rights, as
new countries joined the United Nations. But the structure of those institutions whose membership
and/or voting rights is intended to reflect countries' political or economic power in the world, such




  'Globalisation' describes the growing importance of international links  - of finance, trade, technology
transfer and migration - stemming from the accelerating expansion of global markets and changing
technology. Inevitably, globalisation has widened the repercussions of interactions between nations,
thereby increasing the need for world institutions to address them. Globalisation has expanded
opportunities for some countries and people, but not for others, leading to uneven development and
reinforcing the need for international redistributive processes to assist those countries and people
who have suffered rather than gained.
 
  Globalisation has followed changes in technology, regulations and economic structure. Trade
expansion, for example, is the product of new technologies and cost reductions in transport and
communications; the progressive removal of trade restrictions; increasing convertibility of
currencies; and changes in economic structure which increased the potential for international
specialisation. The growth of international capital movements also stems from technology change
and deregulation of capital markets, with the removal of controls in many countries.  The massive
investments necessary for some new technologies, such as in electronics and aircraft, have meant
that in these areas the world economy is dominated by a very few multinational enterprises. 
Consequently, global trade in capital, technology and labour are expanding. Each is becoming larger
in relation to the domestic use of resources (i.e. resources produced and used in the same country).
 
  Globalisation of the world economy means that international repercussions of domestic activity are
becoming increasingly important; it also means that national action alone cannot regulate or tax many
cross-border transactions. Hence the need has increased for global institutions to regulate such
activity.
 
  Major elements in globalisation are:
 
  • the growth in world trade
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grew annually more than one and a half times as fast as output, from 1950-98. Over this period,
output increased more than five-fold while the value of world trade multiplied nearly fifteen times. 
The proportion of world output accounted for by exports more than doubled between 1965 and
1996, rising from 10% to 22%.  This means that countries are increasingly dependent on world
markets - i.e. on events outside their own country - for the dynamism of their own economy.
 
  The growth of world trade has been uneven, leading to increasing disparities among developing
countries.  Eight countries had export growth of over 10 per cent per annum between 1980 and
1997; and another twenty-five had growth of between 5 and 10 per cent.  Yet, over the same period,
twelve developing countries experienced increases of less than 2 per cent per annum, and exports
fell in four countries. The rapid export growth was more concentrated among middle-income
countries (over three-quarters of the countries with over 10 per cent annual growth), while the slow
growth was more concentrated among low-income countries (seven of the twelve countries).
7   The
poorest countries in the world have seen their share of world trade halve over the last 20 years.
According to a Christian Aid Report, the poorest 10 per cent of the world’s population participate in
less than ½ per cent of world trade.
8
 
  Low-income countries suffered especially from the almost unprecedented fall in commodity prices,
which occurred over this period. Between 1980 and 1998, a weighted index of commodities
(excluding energy) fell by 50 per cent.
9  Within manufactures, also, the terms of trade for products
produced by developing countries worsened (although not as sharply as primary products). The
beneficiaries were producers of high technology products.
10
 
  • the growth in international financial markets
 
  International financial markets expanded first on the basis of the recycled earnings of the oil-
producing countries in the 1970s. Large surpluses (and deficits) in the world have continued to fuel
the markets, while deregulation and technological change have led to the effective internationalisation
of many of the world's financial markets. The daily turnover in foreign exchange is estimated to
exceed $US 1.5 trillion each day (UNDP, 1999).  Portfolio and other short-term capital flows totalled
$7 trillion in the late 1990s, almost three times the level of the 1980s (UNDP, 1999). Unregulated
financial flows can cause severe problems for both developed and developing countries. For
example, the major source of problems for many Latin American countries in the 1980s was the
excessive bank lending of the 1970s. While this was cured, at least temporarily, by the Brady
initiative and debt rescheduling, a new problem has arisen with the resumption of capital flows,
especially those focused on portfolio investment.  Money that can enter a country fast can exit
equally fast, wreaking havoc on the domestic economy.
 
  Mexico's experience in December 1994, followed by the east Asian financial crisis of 1997, provided
clear examples and warnings for countries with similar dependence on capital inflows.  Speculation
on financial markets may lead to sharp exchange rate fluctuations, unjustified depreciation or
                                                
       
7 Data from World Bank 1999.
       
8  Christian Aid, 1999b, p1.
       
9 United Nations 1999.
       
10 UNDP 1992 estimates that nominal prices of manufactures produced by industrialised
countries rose by 35 per cent over the 1980s, while those produced by developing countries
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appreciation, and can cost governments billions of dollars in one day, effectively transferring
resources from governments to those (the upper 1 per cent of the world's income earners) who
participate in financial markets.
11
 
  The distribution of capital flows among countries is uneven, demanding corrective action at a global
level. In general, capital markets favour middle income countries. Low-income countries, which
accounted for 70 per cent of developing country population, received 14 per cent of net
disbursements in 1997.
12 Just twenty countries received more than 80 per cent of foreign direct




  • Transnational corporations
 
  TNCs have acquired increasing significance.  By 1997, dealings between the 100 largest amounted to
an estimated 52.5 per cent of global trade.
14 Global sales of foreign affiliates in host countries are
estimated to have grown by over 15 per cent a year from 1985 to 1994,
15 much faster than the
growth of output. TNCs dominate international technology flows: in the US, receipts from royalties
and license fees by affiliated companies amounted to 70 per cent of total receipts in 1997, and the
proportion was similar, at 65 per cent, for Japanese companies and 73 per cent for Germany.
16 
Even in less direct forms of technology transfer, technology suppliers largely consist of the 'same
multinationals which dominate direct foreign investment'
17
 
  The rising importance of transnational companies necessitates some international authority to
regulate and tax them - since they are far larger than the national economies of many developing
countries, and these countries cannot control their activities.  Nor, indeed, can much larger
countries.
18 Again, the distribution of investment presents a problem. Developing countries as a
whole receive about 30 per cent of TNC investments.
19  FDI is concentrated in a few mainly middle-
income developing countries: from 1987-1998, 72 per cent went to just ten countries: Brazil,
Singapore and Mexico received over a quarter of the flows; China, with 7 per cent of the total, was
                                                
       
11 For example, on 'Black Wednesday' in 1992 the British government lost around $US 3bn.
       
12  OECD, 1999.
       
13  UNDP, 1999.
       
14 United Nations World Investment Report, 1998 (WIR).
       
15 WIR, 1998.
       
16  WIR, 1998.
       
17 Lall, 1987.
       
18  A study by Ernst and Young of 210 TNCs found that 49 per cent were being investigated over
transfer pricing in the UK and 83 per cent had been involved in a transfer pricing dispute at some
time. In 1994-5 the Inland Revenue collected £6.1 billion from companies and individuals for non-
compliance, equivalent to 3.5p on Income Tax. (Financial Times, 23/11/95)
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the only low-income country among the 'top ten' recipients.
20
 
  •    Information technology and communications
 
  ‘The fusion of computing and communications - especially through the Internet - has broken the
bounds of cost, time and distance’ (UNDP, 1999, p57). A 40 page document can be sent from
Madagascar to Cote D’Ivoire by courier, taking five days and costing $75, or by email in minutes,
for less than 20 cents. The communications revolution has linked people and markets  across the
globe much more closely. Yet like the other aspects of globalisation its effects are  highly uneven
both between and within countries. For example, in mid-1998, industrial countries had nearly 90% of
the users. South Asia with one fifth of the world’s population had over half the internet users. 
Within countries, richer people make much greater use of the new technologies than poorer people.
21
The revolutionary changes in global communications requires new forms of global regulation to
prevent tax evasion or avoidance, the use of the new technologies for criminal activities, and evasion
of widely accepted national regulations -e.g. towards pornography.
 
  •    Globalisation and poverty
 
  ‘The world today is wealthier than it has ever been. But also much more sharply uneven’.
22 Poverty
has not been eliminated - indeed the numbers below the poverty line are growing.   Estimates for
1997 suggest that over 1.3 billion people fell below the poverty line:
23 in Sub-Saharan Africa 254m
(46 per cent), in South Asia over 620m (45 per cent), and in Latin America 125m (25 per cent). In a
few countries, poverty rates as high as 70 per cent of the population or more have been noted.  High
infant and maternal mortality rates and malnutrition, low levels of education especially among
females, poor access to water and sanitation are other symptoms of deprivation in many poor
countries.
 
  Globalisation has left a vacuum in governance. National governments cannot regulate, monitor, or
tax many international activities adequately; nor do they redistribute resources on a significant scale
to the world's poor. There are many areas where a global authority could potentially introduce,
regulate or coordinate  taxation (and other forms of regulation), where national authorities find it
difficult or impossible because of globalisation  - for example, in relation to capital flows,
international public resources, such as those of the sea and the air, the Internet.  If globalisation
continues at an accelerating pace, which seems likely as a result of further deregulation and
technological changes, the hole in world governance, like that in the ozone layer, will become
dangerously large.
 
  New objectives
 
  As is to be expected over half a century, particularly one that has seen such major political and
economic changes, the objectives widely accepted by the world community have also changed.
24
                                                
       
20    WIR, 1998.
        
21      In the U.K. 30% of users had annual incomes above $60,000 (UNDP, 1999, p 62).
 
 
          22        Lockwood and Madden, 1997, p1.
 
       
23 I.e. below a poverty line of $1 a day, calculated using purchasing power parity dollars. Poverty
estimates from UNDP, 1999.
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The main economic objectives of the post-World War Two institutions were high levels of
employment and the establishment of a prosperous world economy based on the promotion of free
movement of goods, services and capital.
25 In the event, in the first twenty years after the system
was initiated, the industrialised countries experienced near full employment and their dominant
economic problem then appeared to be inflation rather than unemployment. Subsequently, when
unemployment reappeared in the industrial countries and underemployment emerged as a growing
problem in developing countries, the IFIs seemed to have lost sight of the employment objective,
placing prime emphasis on inflation control, sometimes at the expense of employment and output. A
resurgence of monetarist philosophy contributed to this prioritisation.
 
  A number of important economic and social objectives have gained prominence since 1945.   These
include:
 
  • Development of poor countries (and now promotion of successful transition). This emerged
naturally after developing countries acquired political independence. The World Bank undertook this
objective as its major remit at an early stage.
 
  • Elimination of poverty. At first, it was believed this would be the automatic outcome of
development, but as the failure of  'trickle down' became apparent, 'Basic Needs' was accepted as an
objective by the World Bank, soon to be displaced, however, by ‘stabilisation and adjustment’.  In
the 1990s, poverty reduction has again emerged as an important world objective. The donor
community has agreed on a series of targets for halving world poverty by 2015.
 
  • The fulfilment of Economic and Social Rights. This objective is closely related to both the poverty
elimination and development objectives.  Whilst the rights approach to poverty elimination and
development has been handled within the UN in the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the poverty objective has generally been regarded as the remit of the World Bank.
 
  • Human Development has come to be widely regarded as a central objective, encompassing
development, poverty, and human rights. Initiated by the UNDP, Human Development is defined as
the enhancement of human capabilities and choices by the ‘creation of an enabling environment for
people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives’ (UNDP, 1990, p1).
 
  • Participation and democracy are viewed as essential political components of the development
agenda as part of the right to representation and voice, as well as instrumentally helpful for the
achievement of other objectives.
 
  • Problems of the unregulated market system for the environment, at many levels (ranging from soil
erosion in particular villages to the world greenhouse effect), as well as concern for poverty and
human development, have given growing weight to environmental considerations, often formulated
within the objective of sustainable development.
 
  • Finally, because the employment objective so clearly enunciated at Bretton Woods was
subsequently neglected, it has become necessary to reintroduce high levels of employment as an
                                                                                                                                               
subjectivity in identifying them. The objectives above are deduced from international treaties as well
as from declarations by the UN and prominent political leaders.
       
25 See the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or the preamble to the
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objective, both in developed and developing countries.
26
 
  The objectives listed above are broadly accepted by the international community, in rhetoric if not in
action. There are other objectives arising from our analysis of globalisation on which there is, as yet,
no agreement at an international level, but which would require international action, if and when
agreement on them were reached.  These include the need to monitor and regulate international
markets, such as:
   - capital markets, where unregulated transactions have proved destabilising,  and where the need for
regulation is gaining increasing recognition;
   - commodity markets, where fluctuating prices and adverse terms of trade continue to present
severe problems, especially for the poorest countries;
   - TNCs, whose income is often inadequately taxed;
   - technology markets (encompassing TNCs) where unjustifiably high prices are often charged and
intellectual property rules limit technology transfer and dissemination, and tend to favour the creation
of US or EU-based monopolies. This is especially apparent in the area of health technology, where
there is widespread recognition of the need to combat the failure to develop vaccines against
common developing-country diseases, such as malaria, and to reduce the high price of drugs
(notably for AIDS relief).
 
  Why we need global economic and social institutions
 
  To summarise: global institutions are needed so that national economic and environmental
externalities can be incorporated into decision making; to help regulate international transactions; and
to contribute to world social and economic justice, especially the elimination of poverty. The need
for world institutions to fulfil these functions has grown significantly over the past fifty years, partly
because globalisation has increased the problems caused by unregulated transactions and partly
because global markets have been associated with divergent performance across the world and have
not eliminated poverty. The market cannot be relied on to eliminate such uneven development; rather
it tends to promote it.  Hence the need for international action to secure redistribution between and
within nations. Finally, growing consciousness of the harmful social and economic effects of
environmental degradation has created a new need for international regulation.
 
  III. DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
 
  The Charter of the United Nations provides that:
  "the United Nations shall promote
  a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of social progress and development;
  b. solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems; and international cultural
and educational cooperation; and
  c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" (Article 55).
 
  In principle, then, the Charter requires the United Nations to fulfil the functions of world economic
and social governance discussed earlier in this paper. In practice, a large range of international
institutions - some would say too many - in the UN family have economic and social functions. Yet
none of them adequately fulfils the global functions that we have identified above. Existing
institutions which might appear to have the desired global functions include: ECOSOC (reporting to
                                                
       
26 This is led by the ILO, which published its first World Employment Report in 1995,
and has developed the concept of ‘decent work’ to encompass the quality as well as the quantity of
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the General Assembly) at the heart of the UN, with both economic and social functions; the
Commission on Human Rights and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (both of
which report to ECOSOC), particularly in their role in the definition and implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;  and the two international financial
institutions - the IMF and World Bank - which were assigned some central economic functions and
were instituted as specialised agencies of the United Nations, in principle subject to the overall
coordination of the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC.
27
 
  As originally conceived at Bretton Woods, the UN was to be responsible for macro-economic policy
coordination, development planning and aid; the IMF would provide the international liquidity
necessary to achieve stable exchange rates, world growth and full employment; and the World Bank
(called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) would provide financing for
projects in Europe and in developing countries.
28
 
  In practice, this is not how responsibilities worked out. The UN (through the Security Council,
General Assembly, and ECOSOC) has had minimal international economic functions. It has not been
tasked with either macro-economic coordination or development planning. The aid for which it has
been responsible has been on a small scale relative to other multilateral and bilateral flows. 
Development planning (or policy making) functions, as well as a major part of international aid, have
been assumed by the World Bank. No international institution has taken systematic responsibility for
macro-economic coordination.
 
  The UN Charter gave the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security; uniquely in the UN system, it can take decisions under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter which are binding on all UN Member States of the UN.  It consists of five permanent
members (China, France, Russian Federation, UK and USA) and ten members elected from all UN
members, for a period of two years, thereby ensuring the participation of States from all the major
geographical regions of the world.  There have been calls for the Security Council to expand its
interpretation of  "a threat to international peace and security" to include economic and social factors,
and, to a small degree, recent interventions to provide humanitarian assistance and a recognition of
the role of peace-keeping in post-conflict peace-building are steps in this direction.  However, while,
in theory, there is  latitude for the Security Council to interpret its remit to embrace social and
economic dimensions of peace and security, in practice the traditional division of labour has been
preferred. This means that economic and social issues have been left to the General Assembly and
ECOSOC. Moreover, the absence of Japan and Germany from permanent membership, coupled with
the veto power, make the Security Council, as presently constituted, an unsuitable body for global




  Responsibility for discharging the major economic and social functions in the Charter was given
mainly to ECOSOC, acting under the authority of the General Assembly. ECOSOC was authorised to
undertake studies and report on international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and
related matters, to make recommendations on any matter to the General Assembly and to prepare
draft conventions for the Assembly. ECOSOC was also authorised to coordinate the activities of the
                                                
       
27 The authorised history of the World Bank in its first quarter of a century states: 'the Bank and
Fund became specialised agencies of the United Nations. But they became rather “special”
specialised agencies'. (Mason and Asher, 1973, p58).
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specialised agencies in the economic and social arena.
 
  ECOSOC has 54 members, a considerable enlargement from its original membership of 18. Each
year one third of the membership is subject to election for a three-year period. Although there is no
formal distinction between permanent and non-permanent members, four of the five permanent
members of the Security Council - France, UK, US and the USSR/Russian Federation - have also
always been de facto permanent members of ECOSOC.
29 The other members consist of
representatives of all the major regions of the world, thirty-five from developing regions, thirteen
from developed regions, and six from Eastern Europe.
 
  Each member of the Council has a vote and decisions are made by a majority of those voting.
Consequently, developing countries, with the majority of membership, can dominate decision
making.  ECOSOC discharges most of its work through commissions and committees. There are ten
functional commissions including the Commission on Human Rights, five regional economic
commissions, four standing committees, including the Committee for Development Policy and the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
 
  It is widely agreed that ECOSOC has been ineffective. According to one observer, in practice 'its
contribution has been very limited indeed'.
30 Another comments that 'The Council has proved
superfluous to the UN system for substantive purposes'.
31  ECOSOC has not served as the locus of
world economic and social decision-making.
 
  Various reasons have been suggested for this:
 
  - the membership is too large for the body to be effective;
  - it is overloaded with work. In spite of efforts to streamline its agenda and working methods, the
Council has some 150 bodies reporting to it;
  - its agenda overlaps with that of the General Assembly;
  - it has insufficient power to be able to ensure coordination, especially vis-à-vis the UN specialised
agencies. The powers of recommendation that ECOSOC does possess are often not used to the full;
instead, like the General Assembly, it often adopts decisions and resolutions which "mostly represent
consensus-seeking compromises of great generality."
32
  World economic and social decision-making must receive the assent of the major economic powers.
Without this, resolutions will inevitably be impossible to implement. Given the democratic structure
of representation and voting in ECOSOC and the General Assembly, these will never be accepted as




  The Commission on Human Rights
 
                                                
       
29 The other permanent member of the Security Council, China, was a member for all years
except 1961 to 1971.
       
30 Quinn in Alston (ed.), p97.  All recent evaluations agree on this. See e.g. Childers and
Urquhart, 1994; the Nordic UN Project, 1991; and the report of the Independent Working Group.
       
31 O'Donovan, p124 in Alston (ed.).
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  In principle, the Commission on Human Rights can make a contribution to the social and economic
aspects of world governance by promoting the implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development. In practice,
the Commission has mainly confined its attention to Civil and Political Rights, where it has
investigated and condemned the human rights situation in a large number of countries.  Its
achievements in relation to Economic and Social Rights have hitherto been limited.
 33  The vast
majority of the Commission’s thematic rapporteurs and working groups focus on civil and political
rights, and it is only relatively recently (since the mid-1990s) that there have been any economic,
social or cultural rights Rapporteurs or working groups at all.
 34   The spring 2000 session of the
Commission, for instance, adopted twice the number of resolutions on civil and political rights issues
than it did on economic, social and cultural issues. With respect to extreme poverty, the
Commission's role was confined to drawing the attention of the General Assembly and all United
Nations bodies to the issue, urging ECOSOC to give it 'the necessary attention' and requesting the
Sub-Commission to study it.
 
  The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
 
  This is an independent expert body, established by ECOSOC in 1985.
35  The Committee’s principal
activity is consideration of the reports submitted by States Parties on steps taken, and difficulties
encountered, in implementing the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  The
Committee has clarified the norms contained in the Covenant, expanded the information base and set
in place a system of monitoring country performance.
36  However, the Committee has no effective
power of enforcement if States are not fulfilling their obligations under the Covenant. 
 
  The Committee for Development Policy
37
                                                
        33  According to Alston, 'The Commission's lengthy debates have done very little to promote the
core normative content of economic rights let alone the human rights dimensions of debt, world
trade and development cooperation'. Alston, 1992, p191.
 
 
34  Such current working groups of the Commission on Human Rights include the Open-ended
working group on the right to development and the Open-ended working group established to
elaborate policy guidelines on structural adjustment programmes and economic, cultural and social
rights.  Independent experts (notably not Special Rapporteurs) of the Commission on Human Rights
have been appointed to address: human rights and extreme poverty; structural adjustment policies;
and the right to development.
 
   
35 This replaced the Sessional Working Group on the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  established nine years earlier by ECOSOC res. 1988 (LX)
(1976).  It was renamed the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by ECOSOC res.
1985/17. The current Committee’s composition, organization and administrative arrangements differ
from the Working Group’s it replaced, most notably in that its members are independent experts,
whereas the Working Group was composed of governmental representatives.
 
36 Its system of monitoring could, in principle, provide the basis for international action with respect
to economic and social rights within particular countries.  Some commentators have suggested that
the Committee could play a role in ensuring that the legally-binding standards contained in the
Covenant are respected by States and international organizations, including International Financial
Institutions.
 
37   This committee was previously called the Committee for Development Planning. It was suspended
between 1992 and 1995 following the Secretary-General’s recommendation that it be disestablished.
 After the ECOSOC review of its subsidiary bodies initiated by GA res. 50/227 it was re-establishedQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 16
 
  This, too, is an international committee of experts which meets annually.  Its functions include
evaluation of the programmes of the UN organs and specialised agencies relating to economic
planning and projection and proposed improvements, and the study of development policy issues.  It
has no powers, but can make recommendations to ECOSOC. Hence its effectiveness is limited by
the use ECOSOC makes of its reports.
 
  IMF and World Bank
 
  In principle, the IMF and World Bank, as specialised agencies of the UN, are subject to the overall
coordination of the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC. But the frequent attempts by the UN
General Assembly to strengthen the relationship between the UN and Bretton Woods institutions have
enjoyed only minimal success. As Singer notes, 'In practice it would be difficult to think of any
example where the Bretton Woods Institutions have been in any way influenced by UN resolutions'.
38
Both Boutros-Boutros Gali and Kofi Annan, the most recent Secretary-Generals of the UN, have
made particular efforts to work with the executive heads of the Bretton Woods institutions.
39 In spite
of these efforts, there has been continued reluctance by the governing boards of the IFIs to make
their organisations subject to coordination of any UN organs dominated by developing countries. 
The IFIs have their own decision-making structures, with boards of directors, where voting power
is proportionate to financial contributions to the institutions. This means that the US and Western
Europe dominate the decisions of these institutions.
 
  The system of weighted voting in the IMF
40 is based on each member being assigned a quota in the
form of 'Special Drawing Rights' (SDRs) reflecting a county's economic position and strength.  The
assessment of the quota is determined by economic data such as GNP, currency reserves, foreign
trade potential etc. Each member is given a basic stock of 250 votes plus one vote for each part of
its quota, equivalent to 100,000 SDRs.  The regulations governing voting in the Fund are dispersed
over the entire Agreement, and are very complex.  Generally, decisions require a simple majority of
votes cast.  Certain important decisions (such as the determination of charges for the use of the
Fund's facilities) call for a majority of 70 per cent of the total voting power.  Amendments to the
Fund's Articles of Agreement or decisions such as changes in quotas, the use of IMF gold, the
allocation and cancellation of SDRs or modifications to the principles of their valuation, require a
majority of 85 per cent.  Since the USA holds almost 18.5 per cent of the total voting power, this
gives it the power of veto over any decision which requires this majority.
 
  To be a member of the World Bank, a country must first be a member of the IMF, then it must buy
a share or shares of the capital stock of the Bank, each share being valued at $US 100,000.  Less
than 10 per cent of this money must actually be physically paid to the Bank, the remainder being
"callable" if the Bank needs to fulfil contractual obligations.  The distribution of such capital shares
                                                                                                                                               
under its new name by ECOSOC res. 1998/46.
 
 
38  Singer, 1995.
 
39 Boutros Boutros-Gali was the first UN Secretary-General to address the Development Committee
of the IMF and WB.  Under Kofi Annan, the first high-level meeting of representatives of ECOSOC
and the Bretton Woods institutions was held.  Whilst this meeting amounted more to dialogue than a
coordination of work, there have been moves toward coordination at the country level.
       
40  The information on the voting procedure of the IMF and World Bank sections has been taken
from Wolfrum (ed.), 1995 pp 656-657 and pp 726-727.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 17
provides the basis for the apportionment of voting rights within the organs of the Bank.  In a similar
formula to that used by the IMF, each member has 250 votes plus one further vote per share of
stock held.  The result is that seven industrialised States, namely the USA, UK, Germany, France,
Japan, Italy and Canada control just under 50 per cent of the votes.  Industrialised countries as a
whole hold a majority of votes in the World Bank.
 
  This difference in decision-making is a key element in explaining (i) why in practice the IFIs have
acquired so much more power than the UN
41 in economic matters; (ii) how they have interpreted
their mandate and (iii) why they have not performed their role satisfactorily from a world
perspective.
 
  Both the IMF and the World Bank are powerful economic actors on the world stage - much more so
than the UN. In certain regards, they have acquired more power than was originally envisaged,
especially through policy-conditionality. As a result of the active use of such conditionality, both the
IMF and the World Bank have been enormously influential in determining the economic policy of
borrowing countries - i.e. the majority of developing countries - although their power has rarely
extended to the non-borrowing industrial countries. It is clear that the World Bank has come to be a
much more significant world player than originally envisaged. It has acquired responsibility for a
large proportion of total aid flows, it dominates thought about development through its voluminous
publications, and it has extended its policy-conditions way beyond broad policy directions, such as
enhancing the role of the market and encouraging openness of trade regimes, to detailed meso and
even micro policies.
 
  While both institutions frequently dominate the economic policy-making of the borrowing States,
they have not fulfilled the requisite role of global economic institutions.  Instead they have dealt with
countries one by one.  The IMF is, perhaps, particularly culpable in this regard, as at Bretton Woods
it was intended that it should be responsible for ensuring adequate world liquidity to support global
full employment and economic growth. But the Bancor recommended by Keynes, intended for this
purpose, was not agreed at Bretton Woods. In the 1970s, tentative steps were taken in the direction
of ensuring adequate world liquidity through the issue of Special Drawing Rights, but the experiment
was not repeated, even during the world depression of the early 1980s.
 
  Thus, although both the IMF and the World Bank are in some sense world institutions - i.e. their
operations cover the world - in essence they are not global institutions. They do not take into
account interactions of one country with another, even when they are giving advice to a series of
countries, nor do they ensure that there is coherence between the policies of different ministries
within one country. The IMF and the World Bank do not coordinate world economic policy. They
rarely propose global solutions to global problems. For example, neither institution proposed a global
solution to the debt problem of the 1980s, although this was essential, and eventually one was
introduced by the US Secretary to the Treasury.  On the environment, an issue taken up
enthusiastically by the World Bank, the approach adopted has been to insert environmental
safeguards within particular projects, not to consider global (or even national) regulation.
 
  The Asian financial crisis clearly revealed deficiencies in global governance. Neither the  IMF nor
World Bank predicted the crises, nor were they able to call on adequate resources or to propose an
appropriate policy response.
42 Despite the widespread recognition of the need for what came to be
                                                
       
41 Since the IFIs are, in principle, part of the UN, one ought to say 'the rest of the UN' but the
huge gulf between the IFIs and the rest of the UN means that they have come to be regarded as
quite distinct entities.
       
42 ‘During the period August to December, the IMF programs failed dramatically to meet theQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 18
called ‘new financial architecture’, to provide financial support during crises and assist in orderly
debt workouts, virtually nothing was achieved.
43
 
  The issue of poverty reduction is now accepted as an important consideration by both institutions.
Yet the Bank and Fund's programmes have done little to reduce poverty,  sometimes indeed
themselves contributing to worsening poverty, while specific programmes to reduce poverty have
been so small-scale as to be almost negligible in relation to the size of the problem.
44
 
  The World Trade Organization (WTO)
 
  The WTO is a rules-based organization whose remit is to ‘help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly
and predictably’.
45  The voting structure of the WTO gives a legal equality to developing countries in
decision-making unlike in the IFIs.  Enshrined in the Agreement that established the WTO is the
provision that the WTO shall ‘continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under
the GATT 1947…where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be
decided by voting.’  In meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council each member
of the WTO has an equal vote.  Despite this de jure equality, the direction and agenda of the WTO is
generally agreed by consensus, a consensus that is commonly led by the agenda of the developed
countries.
46   Although the preamble to the Agreement establishing the WTO acknowledges the
objective of sustainable development, and the WTO has a number of bodies whose mandate is to
promote development, it has not ensured that the social benefits of increased and freer trade have
furthered development for all sectors of society.  There are strong indications that freer trade has
done little for the very poor, and that companies from the richer countries benefit most from freer
trade, ‘often at the expense of smaller traders from developing countries’.
47
 
  None of these institutions thus fulfils the functions needed of a world or global economic and social
institution as identified above.
 
  Consequences of the deficiencies in existing institutions
 
  Despite the plethora of institutions, none plays the pivotal role needed in global economic and social
issues. The consequences of this lacuna are that some issues are left without any form of
                                                                                                                                               
objective of restoring confidence... The most important measure of failure of the IMF programs lies
in the outcomes on economic growth.’ Radelet and Sachs, 1998, p 30.
       
43 A US Congressional Committee recognised that the ‘frequency and severity of recent crises
raise doubts about the system of crisis management now in place’. Yet its own recommendations
essentially reduced the role of both the IMF and World Bank (Financial Times, March 7
th  2000).
       
44 See Stewart, 1995.
 
         45 Christian Aid, 1999b.
     
        
46 This is a useful reminder that more majoritarian voting structures in themselves are not
sufficient to ensure equality of influence between North and South in international institutions.
 
       
47 Ibid., p1.  One study finds that an open trading system is associated with lower income growth
among the poorest 40% of the population, but strongly and positively correlated with higher growth
among higher income sections of the population, indicating that the costs of adjusting to trade
reform are borne by the poor  (Lundberg and Squire, 1999).QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 19
international governance; others are solved only on an ad hoc basis.
 
  Until 1999, world economic reviews, appraisal of necessary coordination and recommendations for
policy changes were conducted by ad hoc groupings of the most powerful industrialised countries -
primarily the G7/G8  (consisting of the US, Germany, France, Japan, the UK, Italy, Canada and
Russia), or the G5 (the same group excluding Italy, Canada and Russia) and occasionally the G3 (the
US, Germany, and Japan). Developing countries were completely excluded from these discussions
and decisions. The macro-economic coordination achieved by these groupings has been
unsystematic and largely ineffective.
48
 
  In recognition of the growing economic power of developing countries, in 1999 the G20 was
initiated, a grouping encompassing both industrialised countries and major developing countries, with
the objective of reviewing ‘policy issues among industrialised and emerging markets with a view to
promoting international financial stability’.
49 Membership includes Argentina, Brazil, China, India,
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey as well as the major industrialised
countries.  At major meetings of the G20, it is intended that finance ministers and central bankers
should attend as well as the managing director of the IMF and the president of the WB.  Although its
remit is limited, and its functions only advisory, this is a welcome  effort to incorporate developing
countries systematically in global economic discussions, and thereby partially to address the
democratic deficit at this level. To date, however, the G20 has met rarely and major economic
discussion and decision-making at a global level remains with the industrialised countries, meeting in
the G8.
 
  More democratic and effective forms of international regulation have been achieved in specific areas,
where international discussions are initiated involving all the main parties affected and international
agreements are subsequently reached. Some environmental issues have been dealt with in this way:
e.g. global warming, toxic chemicals, and endangered species.
 
  A third approach has been to convene world meetings on particular subjects: ‘Human Settlements’ in
Istanbul in 1996; ‘Social Development’ in Copenhagen, and ‘Women’ in Beijing, in 1995;
‘Population’ in Cairo in 1994; ‘Human Rights’ in Vienna in 1993; and ‘The Environment and
Development’ in Rio in 1992.  These conferences were genuinely participatory, allowing NGOs as
well as States to attend and contribute. They have drawn attention to issues, but lack effective
follow-up mechanisms to implement agreed programmes of action. The possibilities of more
effective implementation, however, were strengthened after the recommendations contained in the
programmes of action were endorsed by DAC, and taken up by major donors. The institution of
further meetings on each issue five years after the major meeting also provides an opportunity to
review progress and suggest further action.
 
  The fourth solution is a non-solution: it is neglect. This was what happened to the debt situation for
much of the 1980s, until eventually the US saw how costly failure was and helped to bring about a
solution. But in many other areas neglect continues: there are no effective policies against violations
of social and economic rights; multinational companies are able legitimately to avoid taxation; short
term capital flows are unregulated; commodity prices fluctuate and deteriorate without any
international intervention; many environmental abuses continue unchecked.
                                                
       
48 'Moreover, this body [G7] is considered no more effective than the UN General Assembly or
ECOSOC. It has not even proved effective in coordinating policies among the seven member
countries.' Singer, 1995.
       
49 News Release of G-20: http://www.fin.gc.ca/activty/G20/g20221199_e.html.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 20
 
  Ad hoc solutions are often better than inaction, but they do have serious defects:
  - in general, response is late because the problem has to deteriorate before it is noticed, then it takes
time to convene specific meetings and to devise solutions;
  - issues are not looked at as a whole, but one by one – eg. ‘Women’ on one occasion, ‘Children’ on
another;
  - the membership of the particular groupings can be arbitrary, and is often undemocratic, dominated
by a few powerful nations;
-  there are, as has been noted, major omissions, such as the lack of any systematic policy towards
world income distribution and the enforcement of human rights.
IV. THE CASE FOR A WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SECURITY COUNCIL
It is clear that there remains a large gap in the coverage provided by world institutions which
urgently needs to be filled. There is neither economic nor social governance at a world level. As a
consequence, world depressions (or inflation) can emerge through the uncoordinated action of
national governments; world income distribution is the outcome of myriad unrelated actions,
resulting in huge differences in income levels among nations and people; there is no world
enforcement of internationally agreed social and economic rights; and the unregulated power of
TNCs and international capital is growing, sometimes leading to instability in national economies.
There has, however, been progress towards recognising the need for world economic and social
governance since the first version of this paper was produced in early 1996. One step was the
acceptance of the overwhelming need to reduce world poverty by all major donors. A second was
the recognition of deficiencies in current global management in the aftermath of successive financial
crises.  A third step was the formation of the G20, including ten developing countries, which
indicates general acceptance of the need to incorporate major developing countries into world
decision-making. These steps suggest greater political readiness to reform the system of world
governance.
We believe that the creation of a World Economic and Social Security Council (ESSC) is needed to
fill the gap in world governance. The ESSC would replace the present Economic and Social Council
 (ECOSOC) and would have the mandate of ensuring that key economic and social functions
required at an international level are implemented. We do not envisage elaborate new structures. The
ESSC would not itself execute decisions, but would request other institutions - e.g. the IFIs, the
WTO, as well as national governments - to take action that it identified as necessary. However,
where no suitable institution existed it would be able to create one. The ESSC would need a small
permanent secretariat to guide its work, and three advisory panels of experts, one focusing on the
Council's economic, one on its social, and one on its environmental functions.
Its membership would be small, consisting of the ten countries with the greatest economic power,
based on average GNP over the previous five years, and ten members elected for potentially
renewable terms.  The constitution would contain provisions for reviewing the  membership 
selected on the basis of economic variables every twelve years.  Decision-making would not require
unanimity, like the present UN Security Council, but would be on the basis of a two-thirds majority
such that decisions could not be made without the consent of each of the major groupings in the
world, but no single country would be able to veto decisions.
The broad directions of the ESSC’s mandate would be prescribed. But it could add to its functions
over time, as it felt appropriate. This would allow it to react creatively to new issues that may require
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The ESSC would have high-level meetings twice a year to review progress in the world economy as
a whole, to discuss social and economic rights and poverty reduction; to receive reports on actions
taken in response to requests it had previously made; and to identify and consider any major new
problems. Special interim meetings could be convened if a particular crisis arose. It would be
expected that Ministers of Finance attend meetings. Prime Ministers/Presidents would attend if
particularly important decisions were to be taken. Between the high level meetings, routine functions
would be undertaken at a lower level (by the permanent representatives to the UN, supported by the
Secretariat).
The ESSC would have a similar relationship with the as the present Security Council does: i.e.
broadly working in parallel, receiving reports and recommendations from the General Assembly,
while the General Assembly would have the responsibility of selecting the elected members
50. The
ESSC could both take decisions and make recommendations in the economic and social fields
without further resources to the general Assembly’.
51
We spell out the ESSC’s proposed functions, structure and operational rules in greater detail below. 
Here we wish to explain why we believe this sort of Council could succeed where existing
structures have failed.
The first reason is that the Council would reflect the reality of economic and political power in the
world, through its permanent membership and voting structure. A major problem with ECOSOC is
that developing countries have a majority, so the developed countries refuse to give it any power. A
'democratic' structure which fails to give any additional voice in decision-making to the economically
powerful countries will not be in a position to take effective action, as the story of ECOSOC shows.
Consequently, decisions are taken in bodies where developing countries are excluded completely
(e.g. G3, G5, G8), or where they can always be overruled (IMF, World Bank). The proposed ESSC
would incorporate developing countries and countries in transition. They would be in a position to
raise issues they wished to be considered, and, collectively, to veto action they did not like.
Secondly, the ESSC would be small (membership of approximately 20) making it a much more
manageable body than ECOSOC.
Thirdly, it is intended that the political standing of those participating would be high, so those present
would be in a position to commit their governments to implement their decisions. 
Fourthly, the ESSC would not itself execute any of its decisions, but would request other (normally
extant) bodies to do so.  Hence the functions of existing institutions would not be duplicated and a
large bureaucracy would not be needed. For International Institutions, including the IFIs and other
specialised agencies, the directions of the ESSC would be mandatory, overruling those of their own
Boards of Directors. National governments would  be recommended to take action, although the
ESSC might at some stage devise penalties if national governments systematically rejected requests.
V. FUNCTIONS, COMPOSITION AND PROCEDURES OF THE ESSC
A. The main functions proposed are:
                                                
   
50    ‘The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly is intricate and fluid.”
See  Bailey and Daws, 1998, p 281, which expounds the relationship.
51     In this respect the ESSC would be very different from ECOSOC, which it would replace, as
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i) to review the functioning of the world economy and identify major problems from the perspective
of ensuring sustained economic growth and high levels of employment; to act on any problems, and
request action from governments, the IFIs, specialised agencies of the UN and the WTO; to institute
further studies; and to convene international meetings;
ii) to review progress in the promotion of social goals and poverty reduction; to take action at both
international and national levels, as for economic problems;
iii) to review world environmental problems and identify appropriate action;
B. The composition and procedures of the UN ESSC
Five main issues need to be addressed. On each, considerable negotiation would be needed in order
to settle on a formula that would be acceptable internationally. Here we make some suggestions as a
starting point for discussions.
(1)  Optimum overall size of the Council
The optimum size for any entity depends on the size most likely to maximise its efficiency and
effectiveness. A Council of just one or two members, for example, would be very efficient, but
clearly not effective as it would lack the legitimacy conferred by a more representative membership.
However, a Council with too many members would be in danger of being both inefficient and
ineffective.  The experience of other UN bodies, including that of ECOSOC, suggests that a
membership of  twenty to twenty-five members, would be the best solution. With this size the
geographical distribution of UN membership can be represented adequately, yet the Council would
still be small enough to allow the genuine exchange of views, complex negotiations and executive
decision-making, in contrast to the bland, consensus-oriented decisions that so often characterise
larger UN bodies such as ECOSOC and the General Assembly.
(2) Categories of membership
The Council would have two types of semi-permanent members: those selected according to
economic criteria (such as GNP) and those elected by the UN General Assembly on renewable three-
year terms.
52  The list of States selected according to economic criteria could be reviewed every 12
years, to allow for major changes in economic status.  Elected members would be nominated by
their regional electoral group and approved by the UN General Assembly.  The decision to allow
elected members to be immediately re-elected to the ESSC might work against the election of smaller
powers to the Council.  A variation would be to designate some or all or the ten elected seats as
ineligible for such immediate re-election
.53
(3) Criteria for membership and method of election
There are no criteria for selection of permanent members of the Security Council, who were chosen
in 1945 for political reasons and have not been reviewed since. This has led to some serious
anomalies. The method outlined above, combining objective economic criteria with elections based
                                                
52 A precedent for this can be found in the 9 October 1946 Constitution of the International Labour
Organisation.  Article 7(2) of the Constitution of the ILO states that, of the twenty-eight persons
representing governments on the ILO Governing Body ‘…ten shall be appointed by the Members of
chief industrial importance’.
53 Whilst the League of Nations Council had a limited number of semi-permanent members who were
permitted to stand for immediate re-election, this model was rejected by the UN Charter which
established that the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council must wait for one year
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on geographical distribution would provide a workable yet more democratic alternative in the
proposed ESSC.  The distribution of elected members could be roughly proportional to the size of
existing UN regional electoral groupings, but with flexibility to allow for the further representation of
regions under-represented in the economic criteria membership category.
54
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On the basis of GNP (by Purchasing Power Parity) in 1998, the list of semi-permanent members
would be:
US, China, Japan, India, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Brazil, and the Russian Federation.
Proposed membership distribution of the ESSC
Regional groups No. of members selected
by economic criteria




     5    3
Eastern Europe      1     1
Asia      3     2
Africa      0     3
Latin America and the
Caribbean
     1     2
Developed countries        7 (inc. Russian Fed.)     4 (inc. E.Europe)
Developing countries        3     7
a. The category of ‘Western Europe and Others Group’ (WEOG) exists as an electoral grouping in the
United Nations for elections of regional candidates to non-permanent seats on the Security Council and for
other electoral purposes. As well as Western European States, this category includes Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the USA.  There have been calls at the General Assembly for a reconfiguration of the
electoral group system including WEOG.  If this occurs, the distribution of seats in the proposed ESSC
would need to be amended accordingly.
(4) Voting Procedure
Each member would have one vote. A voting procedure is needed that is more flexible than the
unanimity rule of the Security Council, where the vote of just one country is enough to veto action;
but is more stringent than purely majority voting so that major groupings in the world cannot be
outvoted when they act together.  Whilst it is hoped that consensus decision-making would be the
norm, it is proposed that if voting is necessary, a majority of two-thirds of those States present
would be required for both procedural and non-procedural issues. This means that neither developed
nor developing countries can pass resolutions without at least some support from members from the
other category.
(5) Relationship to other UN bodies and to other intergovernmental and nongovernmental entities
The procedure for participation of non-members, consultation with other interested parties, and the
receipt of communications from non-governmental entities would be modelled on The Provisional
Rules of Procedure of the UN Security Council.
C. Advisory Commissions
Three Advisory Commissions would identify issues to be addressed by the ESSC in the economic,QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 25
social, and environmental areas.   These would replace the present Committee for Development
Policy, Commission for Social Development, and Commission for Sustainable Development.
D. Place of the ESSC in the UN system as a whole
The ESSC would be a new Principal UN Organ, replacing ECOSOC.   The major UN specialised
agencies in the economic and social spheres, including the World Bank and the IMF, would report to
the ESSC.  The reform would provide an opportunity to review the work of the functional
commissions, standing committees, expert and ad hoc committees, reducing their number and
streamlining their functions. Many of the functions of these bodies are already duplicated elsewhere
in the UN system.  Certain bodies could come under the umbrella of the UN Development
Programme or UNCTAD, or be merged with existing programmes or committees of these two
organizations.  Some of the existing commissions and committees under ECOSOC could be
subsumed under the three ESSC Advisory Commissions.  Following these reforms, the abolition of
the following bodies should be considered: The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources for
Development, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development, the Committee for
Development Policy, and the Meeting of Experts on Public Administration and Finance.  The ESSC
should also review, rationalise and streamline the functions of the specialised agencies in the
economic, social and environmental spheres.
E. History of proposals for an Economic Security Council
The idea of creating a high level Council at the UN to oversee major international economic
developments is not new. Over the past decade there have been a series of proposals for the creation
of a high level Council at the UN with economic (and sometimes social) functions, similar to that
proposed here.
55 It is worth reviewing these briefly to indicate the wide support the idea has from
independent observers of the UN system:
• A report to the UN's Joint Inspection Unit recommended the establishment of an Economic
Security Council to act as a UN forum to deal with economic problems
56;
• the Nordic United Nations Project recommended a high level International Development Council to
give effective guidance and cohesion to the executive organs of the UN's operational activities
57;
• the UNDP's Human Development Report 1994 proposed an Economic Security Council which
would be a 'decision-making forum at the highest level to review the threats to global economic
security and agree on the necessary action.' (p10);
• The Report of the Commission on Global Governance also supported the establishment of an
Economic Security Council
58;
• The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations recommended
the establishment of two Councils: an Economic Council and a Social Council.  The Economic
Council 'should, in consultation with the Social Council, the Security Council and the General
Assembly, be empowered to formulate guidelines to integrate the work of all UN agencies and
                                                
     
55 These are described by Arnold, 1995.
     
56 Bertrand, 1985.
     
57The Nordic UN Project, 1991.
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international institutions, programs and offices engaged in economic issues.'
59 The Social Council
'should be empowered to supervise and integrate the work of all UN activities related to Social
Development'.
60
• Ul Haq et al. proposed the establishment of a Development Security Council 'to provide a decision-
making forum at the highest level to ensure global human security.. to review critical social and
economic threats to people all over the globe and to reach political agreement on specific policy
responses'
61
• Former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, while not directly advocating the
establishment of an Economic Security Council, argued that "the Economic and Social Council might
introduce a flexible high-level inter-sessional mechanism in order to facilitate a timely response to
evolving socio-economic realities"
62  In October 1995 he reiterated his call for such a mechanism as
a means by which ECOSOC could be invited to provide the Security Council with "reports on
situations in the economic and social areas which, in its opinion, constitute threats to international
peace and security".
63
• In 1998 the Indian government proposed the establishment of an Economic Security Council, ‘with
wide-ranging representation including World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other relevant
financial bodies’.
64
• Support for the idea has also come from, among others, contributors to the ‘Agenda for
Development’ discussions at the General Assembly; ‘The People’s Summit Core Document’
prepared for The Other Economic Summit, May 1998; the former Secretary General of the
Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal; and papers from various branches of the UNA.
All of these recommendations have been justified by similar reasoning to that put forward in this
paper - that there is an absence of economic and social governance at a world level and that severe
adverse consequences flow from this.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are evidently a number of important economic, social and environmental issues for which
global action is needed. There are currently a large number of international institutions, but these do
not fulfil the functions needed at a world level. The most powerful economic institutions (the IMF
and the World Bank) basically operate on a country-by-country not a global basis. Moreover, the
industrialised countries alone determine the agenda of the IFIs. Various organs of the UN (notably
the General Assembly and ECOSOC) have global social and economic functions but, in practice, do
not use them productively. The ineffectiveness of these institutions is partly due to their large size,
and partly to their 'democratic' structure which means that the economically powerful countries can
be overruled by developing countries in these arenas.
                                                
     
59 Report of the Independent Working Group, 1995, p29.
     
60 Ibid, p36.
     
61 Ul Haq et al., 1995,  p 10.
     
62UN Secretary-General, Report of the Work of the Organization, 1992, cited in GA/50/697, 27
October 1995.
     
63General Assembly document no. GA/50/697, 27 October 1995, p.23
     
64 Address by the Indian Finance Minister, Yashwant Sinha, to the Commonwealth Finance
Ministers, Ottawa, Sept. 30
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The current vacuum in decision-making has led to various ad hoc solutions which are unsatisfactory
because they are unsystematic and often exclusionary (i.e. developing countries are left out of
decisions which affect them), while some issues are completely neglected.
The creation of a new Principal organ of the United Nations has been proposed in this paper - an
Economic and Social Security Council - which would overcome many of the weaknesses in the
current system. To ensure that the ESSC is perceived to be legitimate by all sectors of the
international community, its membership and voting structure would reflect the reality of economic
power in the world, yet ensure representation and a voice for States at all levels of development.  In
this paper we have made a specific proposal to balance power and representation within the context
of an efficient and effective new UN organ.  We do not claim to have got the balance exactly right,
or to have found the perfect solution, and we welcome other formulations for a composition and
voting structure that would achieve the objectives outlined in this paper.  A summary of our
proposals for the membership and voting structure of the ESSC is outlined below, with illustrations
of how these compare with existing UN bodies:QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 28
Comparison of composition and voting mechanisms in the World Bank, IMF, ECOSOC, Security Council







IBRD/IDA Average 71% 29% Weighted voting for each member
dependent upon quota formula of
financial contributions. Decisions
require between 50% and 85% of
total voting power.
IMF 69% 31%
ECOSOC 35% 65% One vote per member. Decisions
require a simple majority of those





One vote per member. Decisions on
non-procedural issues require the
affirmative vote of at least 9
members, including the concurring
b








t    Total
d 53% 47%





One vote per member. Consensus
decision-making the norm.  When
voting takes place decisions require
a two-thirds majority of those
present and voting, for both
procedural and non-procedural
issues.
t Elected members 36% 63%
t           Total 52% 48%
a.      This category includes Eastern European States.
b.      Thus strictly speaking an abstention by a permanent member of the Security Council should count as
a veto, however in practice an abstention has been regarded as a concurring vote; see Bailey and Daws,
1995, p.22.
c.      The range here results from the fact that one of the Asian electoral group "seats" for non-permanent
membership of the Security Council frequently goes to an industrialised Asian country (often to Japan). 
For the same reason the figures for ECOSOC have varied in the past.  The inclusion of Japan and India in
the economic criteria membership of the ESSC makes this variation less pronounced in the new body.  In
the early 1990s a number of the former Republics of the USSR joined the Asian electoral grouping and the
Group of 77 developing countries.
d.    Based on membership in 1997.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 29
The ESSC would replace ECOSOC.  The ESSC would not itself have any administrative duties, but
would operate by requesting action from existing institutions, including the IFIs, UN agencies and
national governments.  Consequently the changes proposed would not represent a further burgeoning
of the UN. Indeed the replacement of ECOSOC and the abolition of some of the bodies reporting to
it would lead to a slimming down of the UN as a whole, with an increase in its effectiveness.
The virtues of a Council of this kind would be similar - in the economic and social arenas - to those
of the Security Council in security matters. I.e. it would provide a flexible venue where urgent global
issues could be considered at a very high level. It would not, of course, compel world leaders to take
action that they disliked. But it would ensure systematic discussion of major issues, leading to action
in those areas where sufficient consensus existed.
Ad hoc solutions to particular problems can sometimes be more effective than action at a world
level. But these can also be partial and unrepresentative. The new ESSC would not prevent ad hoc
initiatives, but would ensure that they were reviewed at a world level.
International institutions cannot create consensus where none exists; but they can encourage and
facilitate more "one world" and less nationalistic and piecemeal approaches to global developments.
This is a contribution that we believe an ESSC would make.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 30
References
Alston, P., ed., 1992, The United Nations and Human Rights, A Critical Appraisal (Oxford:
Clarendon)
Arnold, T, 1995,  Reforming the UN: Its Economic Role, The Royal Institute of International Affairs
Discussion Paper 57 
Bailey, S.D. and Daws, S., 1995, The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide 3
rd Edn., London,
Macmillan.
Bailey, S.D. and Daws, S., 1998, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 3
rd Edn. , Oxford, 
OUP.
Bertrand, M, 1985,  Some Reflections on Reform of the United Nations, JIU/REP/85/9, Geneva
Chen, S., G.Datt and M. Ravallion, 1994, ‘Is poverty increasing in the developing world?’, Review
of Income and Wealth, 40:4. pp. 359-375
Childers, E and B Urquhart, 1994, Renewing the United Nations System, Development Dialogue
1994:1
Christian Aid, 1999a, ‘In debt to disaster’, London, Christian Aid.
Christian Aid, 1999b, ‘Fair shares? Transnational companies, the WTO and the world’s poorest
communities’, London, Christian Aid.
Lall, S, 1987, Technology transfer, foreign investment and indigenous capabilities, processed,
Institute of Economics, Oxford.
Lockwood, M. and P. Madden, 1997, ‘Closer together, further apart: a discussion paper on
globalisation’, London, Christian Aid.
Lundberg, L. and L.Squire, 1999, ‘Inequality and growth: lessons for policy’, Washington DC,
World Bank.
Mason, E. and R. Asher, 1973, The World Bank since Bretton Woods (Washington DC: Brookings)
O'Donovan, D., 1992, 'The Economic and Social Council' in P.Alston (ed) (1992).
OECD, Development Cooperation, DAC Report, Paris, OECD.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 31
Oman, C. quoted in D. Ghai, 1993, 'Structural adjustment, global integration and social democracy'
in D.Prendergast and F.Stewart (eds.) Market Forces and World Development (London: Macmillan).
Quinn, J., 1992, 'The General Assembly into the 1990s' in P. Alston (ed.)
Radelet, S. and J. Sachs, 1998, ‘The east Asian financial crisis: diagnosis, remedies and prospects’,
Cambridge, Mass, HIID .
Ravallion, M., 1993, 'Growth and poverty: evidence for Developing Countries in the 1980s',
Economic Letters
Singer, H.W., 1995, 'Historical Background to the Bretton Woods System and its Relation to the UN
System', in  Bouda Etemad, Jean Batou and Thomas David (eds), Pour une histoire economique et
sociale internationale. Melanges offerts a Paul Bairoch, (Geneva: Editions Passe Present).
Stewart, F., 1995, Adjustment and Poverty: Options and Choices (London: Routledge)
The Nordic UN Project, 1991, The United Nations in Development, Stockholm
The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, 1995, Our Global Neighbourhood, (Oxford
University Press)
The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, 1995, The
United Nations in its Second Half-Century, Ford Foundation
Ul Haq, M, R Jolly, P Streeten and K Haq, 1995, The UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions,
(London: Macmillan)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1999, Human Development Report 1999, New
York, OUP.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1990, Human Development Report 1990, New
York, OUP.
UNDP, 1992,  Human Development Report 1992, New York, OUP.
UNDP, 1999 Human Development Report 1999, New York, OUP.
UN General Assembly, 1995, Restructuring and Revitalization of the United Nations in the
Economic, Social and Related Fields - Report of the Secretary-General, A/50/697, 27 October 1995
United Nations, 1999, Economic and Social Survey 1998/9, New York, United Nations.
United Nations, 1998, World Investment Report 1998, Geneva, United Nations.
United Nations, 1995, World Economic and Social Survey 1995, (New York: United Nations)
United Nations, 1992, World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth
(New York: United Nations)
Wolfrum, R (Ed.), 1995, United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers)QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS68 Page 32
World Bank, 1999, World Development Indicators CD ROM 1999, Washington DC, World Bank.
World Bank, 1994, World Development Report 1994, (Washington DC: World Bank)